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What ails the Pacific and what are 
the remedies? These are perennial and
much debated questions for Islanders
and their principal aid donors. A con-
ventional diagnosis focuses on the
tyrannies of distance and small econ-
omies of scale. This perspective has
prompted the Pacific Islands Forum
(pif) to revisit the merits of deepening
regionalism as a means to overcome
national weaknesses. To this end the
past year has seen agreement on 
wide-ranging reform of the Forum 
to facilitate regional integration and
cooperation.
Another long-standing school of
thought attributes blame for contem-
porary ills on the economic and polit-
ical structures imposed by departing
colonial powers and their uneasy
coexistence with tradition. One way
of rectifying, or at least mitigating,
negative aspects of this legacy is the
donor-inspired agenda to promote
good governance, notably to tackle
corruption. The ubiquitous practice 
of corruption is an ongoing preoccu-
pation of aid donors, Pacific leaders,
and civil society, yet policies to com-
bat it have delivered variable out-
comes. A recent study of corruption
in the Pacific recommends a change 
in strategy.
In the security domain, violent
conflicts have arisen in the Pacific for
a range of reasons (see von Strokirch
2001), but there is no doubt that the
impact of these conflicts has been
more profound and their duration
prolonged as a result of access to
guns. The proliferation of small arms
and their illicit use has to date been
most marked in Melanesia. Neverthe-
less, throughout the Pacific the poten-
tial for conflicts involving arms must
be prevented with effective regional
action rather than just reaction to
crises after they occur. The scope of
the problem, lessons from past con-
flicts, and the merits of emerging
international strategies are assessed
here.
Developments concerning health
trends are rarely addressed in any
depth in this annual review, but the
pandemic of hiv/aids warrants an
exception to the rule. Current trends
and risk factors suggest that the cata-
strophic impact of hiv/aids in Africa
and Asia could be replicated in the
Pacific. Unlike the recent tsunami in
Asia, hiv/aids is not a natural disas-
ter beyond human control. Rather it
is predominantly a sexually trans-
mitted infection, control of which 
is highly amenable to concerted pre-
vention strategies. Notwithstanding
delays in responding to the problem
in the Pacific, the regional
anti–hiv/aids campaign has recently
gained momentum and substance at
all levels of politics and civil society.
Regardless of ideological perspec-
tives and associated whole of govern-
ment prescriptions, there is wide-
spread agreement on the profoundly
negative impact of corruption, small
arms, and hiv/aids on Pacific soci-
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eties and economies. These trends are
worsening and inexorably under-
mine—indeed cancel out—efforts 
to promote peace and development.
All three issues have recently been
addressed with varying degrees of
commitment in global, regional, and
donor strategies to enhance human
security and development. The nature
and efficacy of these strategies provide
a thematic focus for analysis of this
year in review. First, however the lat-
est attempt to reform the preeminent
regional institution warrants analysis.
On the initiative of the pif chair,
New Zealand Prime Minister Helen
Clark, the 2003 leaders’ meeting in
Auckland mandated an Eminent Per-
sons Group (epg) to review the
Pacific Islands Forum’s role, function,
and Secretariat. The Eminent Persons
Group reported in April 2004 to a
Pacific Islands Forum Special Leaders’
Retreat, which in turn adopted its key
recommendations in the Auckland
Declaration and Leaders’ Decisions
(pifslr 2004). Most of the sixty-page
epg report provided a broad overview
of diverse challenges facing the Pacific
Islands region and as such was not
stating anything controversial (epg
2004). The same could be said of the
resulting “Pacific Vision” to guide
forum actions and policies. The vision
was essentially a “motherhood state-
ment” by leaders, typical of multilat-
eral organizations, emphasizing the
pursuit of security and prosperity,
valuing of cultures, and promotion of
good governance, sustainable develop-
ment, democracy, and human rights
(pifslr 2004, paragraph 1).
The epg report made reference to
the Pacific Way’s acceptance of diver-
sity and parallel commitment to unity
and consensus, yet simultaneously
asserted the need to openly and
respectfully deal with problems of
governance (epg 2004, 20). In doing
so the Eminent Persons Group tried to
strike an awkward balance between
Pacific and metropolitan values and
methods. Whereas Pacific Island lead-
ers adhere to asean-style principles of
face-saving, consensus, and noninter-
ference, Australia and New Zealand
(and outside the Forum, the United
States) have increasingly overridden
these notions with an emphasis on
effective intervention. As a result of
the tension between these views, there
was no mention of the Pacific Way in
the leaders’ declaration or decisions.
The proposal for a Pacific Plan
clearly advocated deeper regional
cooperation. A taskforce led by the
pif secretary-general and overseen by
select leaders was to be set up after
the 2004 Forum to develop the plan.
In the first instance, the plan would
identify sectors in which resources
could be pooled and provide recom-
mendations on the priorities (pifslr
2004). Previously there had been
progress in developing regional poli-
cies in several domains such as nuclear
issues, climate change, trade, and
fisheries. The epg report suggested
areas where more cooperation could
be fruitful, including transport, digital
strategy, quarantine and customs,
trade facilitation, financial systems,
public administration, law enforce-
ment, international representation,
and compliance with new interna-
tional laws.
With regard to security, the epg
report rightly noted that the relevant
pif declarations lack teeth and that
conflict prevention must take priority
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over conflict resolution, though the
report failed to indicate how to pro-
ceed on this score. The leaders agreed
with the Eminent Persons Group that
the pif secretary-general should take
a more proactive role in coordinating
responses to regional crises. However,
the vague epg proposal for leaders to
consider developing a unique “model”
for economic and political integration
(echoing the Australian Senate Com-
mittee’s call in 2003 for a Political
and Economic Community) was pre-
mature and thus omitted from the
leaders’ decisions (epg 2004, 23–24;
see also von Strokirch 2004).
In a section entitled “Focus on
People,” the epg report advocated
greater inclusiveness in the Forum’s
regionalism. The document reiterated
the newfound aid donor mantra of
engaging women, youth, and civil
society to address their concerns. In
addition, it said the Forum should
support members in developing
national human-rights machinery. The
group also made explicit recommen-
dations for the Forum Secretariat to
mainstream the needs of Small Island
States into its work and for greater
engagement with territories outside
the Forum by granting them observer
status (epg 2004, 28–31). These rec-
ommendations were incorporated in
the leaders’ decisions. The Eminent
Persons Group had specifically called
for all US and French dependencies to
be integrated as Forum observers, yet
it made no reference to the Indone-
sian territory of Papua. This omission
was despite the fact that the Melane-
sians of Papua share a border with
Papua New Guinea and have a long
history of regionalism with Pacific
neighbors dating back to the inau-
gural South Pacific Conference.
Immediate, specific, and concrete
epg recommendations, confirmed by
Forum leaders, related to reforms of
regional institutions. These include the
secretary-general and chair’s positions;
the Forum Secretariat; the Forum
Officials’ Committee; respective meet-
ings of Forum leaders, dialogue part-
ners, and ministers; and the Council
of Regional Organizations in the
Pacific. The main aim was to clarify
the mandates of agencies, streamline
meetings, and delegate decision mak-
ing to avoid duplication and bureau-
cratic inefficiency. They identified a
paramount need to reverse the ten-
dency for routine reporting and rub-
ber-stamping of officials’ recommen-
dations to dominate leaders’ meetings.
Instead, Forum agendas, especially
those of retreats, should focus on
significant issues that require consid-
eration and decisions by leaders. One
issue not addressed was the burgeon-
ing membership of the Post-Forum
Dialogue and whether this risks
reducing its relevance. Since Thai-
land’s admission in 2004 there are
now thirteen dialogue partners. Yet,
for the most part, the institutional
reforms were constructive and achiev-
able in the short term.
One issue that has increasingly
occupied the attention of Forum lead-
ers is corruption. The abuse of office
for private gain is not unique to the
Pacific Islands or to developing coun-
tries. For this reason a Global Con-
vention Against Corruption was
adopted by United Nations’ members
for signature in 2003. For developing
countries, corruption has nefarious
ramifications for development, democ-
racy, and accountability to aid donors.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
summed up its negative impact:
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“Corruption hurts the poor dispro-
portionately—by diverting funds
intended for development, undermin-
ing a government’s ability to provide
basic services, feeding inequality and
injustice, and discouraging foreign
investment and aid” (unodc 2003,
4). Corruption is also associated with
unsustainable exploitation of natural
resources.
At a political level, corruption
undermines the integrity of state insti-
tutions, including the government,
judiciary, public service, and security
forces. The corrosion of public trust
and confidence leads to a deficit in
state legitimacy and hence authority.
On a social level, high levels of cor-
ruption among holders of public office
undermine respect for the law and
contribute to an escalation in crime.
In democracies, particularly fledgling
or transitional ones, corruption inter-
feres with the proper functioning of
democracy, notably in the threat it
poses to fair elections and to account-
ability on the part of those elected to
office. This leads to popular skepti-
cism about the merits of democracy,
although in reality undemocratic gov-
ernments tend to have equally poor if
not worse records of corruption.
Transparency International is a
nongovernmental organization that
has spearheaded global and national
efforts to monitor, analyze, and com-
bat corruption. From 2003 to 2004 it
undertook studies of corruption in
twelve Pacific Island countries in addi-
tion to two earlier studies on Fiji and
Papua New Guinea. The organiza-
tion’s aim is to facilitate effective
national anti-corruption strategies.
Transparency International studies
focus on the National Integrity
System (nis), this being the sum total
of a country’s laws, institutions, and
practices that maintain the account-
ability of public, private, and civil
society organizations. The nis
approach assesses not only the formal
structures but also how they function
in practice, because the legal frame-
work alone is often not a reflection 
of a country’s ability to prevent or
combat corruption.
In line with the thematic focus of
Transparency International’s 2004
Global Corruption Report, a 2004 nis
regional overview of the Pacific found
that political corruption is the main
cause for concern. This is the case
with vote buying, other irregularities
during elections, and parliamentary
maneuvering for support by tenuous
coalition governments. Government
ministers are most at risk of corrup-
tion, due to their powers of regula-
tion, licensing, granting tenders, pub-
lic service recruitment, bestowal of
scholarships, and access to perks such
as travel allowances. At all levels of
office, certain sectors are more vulner-
able to corrupt activities, including
police and customs, land administra-
tion, forestry and fisheries, ports,
health and education, and retirement
funds. Trade in the tokens of sover-
eignty, such as passports, letters of
credit, Internet domain names, and
offshore banking, are also problem-
atic areas. On the positive side, the
judiciary, electoral administration,
and audit offices of most countries 
are remarkably free of corruption
(Larmour and Barcham 2004).
There is much debate about the
causes of corruption in the Pacific.
The introduced capitalist economy
and the associated values of individu-
alism, materialism, and greed have
contributed to the pursuit of personal
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power and wealth that fuels corrup-
tion. In traditional societies leaders
were limited in the amount of food,
labor, or other goods they could
access or use to curry influence, while
such transactions were open and of
modest proportions (Crocombe 2001,
516). By contrast, today’s leaders can
command formidable resources via
government coffers, which are in turn
replenished by income from natural
resource exploitation and overseas
aid. Preoccupation with the influence
of traditional gift-giving cultures
tends “to obfuscate the insidious
reality of corruption. Customary gift
giving is traditionally open within the
clan, [but] its clandestine translation
into politics or commerce” is quite a
different matter (Findlay 2003, 115).
Most commentators agree that the
small scale of Pacific Island societies,
especially elite networks, and the
traditional emphasis on kinship and
reciprocity have fostered tolerance 
of corruption.
International donors are clear
about strategies to address corruption.
Their prescriptions focus on strength-
ening and reforming democratic insti-
tutions, financial accountability, and
the rule of law. These elements feature
in the drive for good governance.
Pacific countries, with the exception
of Tonga, are democracies with inde-
pendent judiciaries. All the micro-
states have government auditors, and
many have ombudsmen. Yet these
agencies are poorly resourced and
largely ineffective. Those auditors and
ombudsmen who have called govern-
ment to account tend to be ignored,
while persistent critics are replaced by
more compliant figures. Countries
with a wide range of formal checks
and balances, such as Solomon
Islands, Papua New Guinea, and
Vanuatu, have had little success in
reducing corruption. There have been
calls to set up independent commis-
sions against corruption in the Pacific,
but unless such an agency is given
financial and political support it is
destined to be another lame duck.
The need is not so much to create
new laws or agencies as to more
effectively apply existing ones (Lar-
mour and Barcham 2004, 16).
Another approach has been to
promote anti-corruption norms by
setting up codes of conduct. The
Pacific Islands Forum adopted eight
principles of accountability in 1997,
good governance was the first princi-
ple enunciated in the 2000 Biketawa
Declaration, and 2003 saw the adop-
tion of comprehensive Forum princi-
ples of good leadership. While these
are useful goals, they rely on political
or ethical obligation and are not
legally binding. It is left to national
executives and legislatures to apply the
principles if, when, and how they see
fit. Governments of some Pacific coun-
tries such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
and Vanuatu have legislated their own
leadership codes of conduct. Yet these
regional and national approaches rely
on leaders and members of parliament
to do the right thing—which is
unlikely given that many politicians
engage in corruption.
In view of the inability or unwill-
ingness of politicians to effectively
apply anti-corruption measures to
their subordinate officials, much less
themselves, the impetus for change
must come from outside the state.
However, the problem lies not just
with politicians and officials, as cor-
ruption is a two-way street. Citizens
allow their votes to be bought, rela-
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tives encourage nepotism, and com-
panies offer bribes, while some non-
governmental organizations have
integrity problems of their own. A
lack of transparency is not a major
issue in small Pacific societies, as most
people are well aware of who is cor-
rupt (Larmour and Barcham 2004).
Yet there is a high level of public
tolerance toward the practice due 
to intimidation, apathy, or, in some
cases, complicity. In this respect,
accountability is also a two-way
process, insofar as the public must
demand that governments be
accountable.
To be effective, norms against cor-
ruption must be developed and
embraced at the grassroots level.
Transparency International has high-
lighted the capacity for civil society to
combat corruption: “Great responsi-
bility rests with the regulatory poten-
tial of civil society in the Pacific,
where governments resist accountabil-
ity [and] the integrity of the public
and private sectors are in question.
. . . The media in particular play a
crucial role in empowering civil soci-
ety” (Findlay 2003, 124). A vigilant
civil society in cooperation with an
independent media can help to make
anti-corruption laws work by con-
demning irregularities and monitoring
enforcement (Transparency Interna-
tional 2004, 2). For example, an
alliance involving the media, ombuds-
man, the local ti chapter, nongovern-
mental organizations, and business
groups was established to target cor-
ruption during the 2002 PNG elec-
tions. A key finding of the 2004
National Integrity System report on
the Pacific was that an effective anti-
corruption strategy must focus less on
the supply side of institutions and
laws and more on stimulating popular
debate on minimal anti-corruption
norms and parallel demand for their
enforcement (Larmour and Barcham
2004).
The 2004 Forum exhorted mem-
bers to sign and ratify the 2003
United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC). Unlike Forum
principles, the UN treaty imposes a
legal obligation to implement desig-
nated anti-corruption measures. By
the end of 2004 there were 113 signa-
tories and thirteen parties. Australia
and New Zealand were the only
Forum members to sign up. The
treaty will enter into force three
months after the thirtieth ratification.
Member countries will be required to
establish criminal offenses to cover a
wide range of acts of corruption. Crit-
ically for the developing world, they
agree to cooperate in prosecuting
offenders, and ill-gotten gains will be
returned to the countries from which
they were stolen. An entire chapter of
the convention focuses on preventive
measures, including the need to raise
public awareness and involve civil
society (UNCAC 2003). The conven-
tion demonstrates a willingness by 
the international community to
strengthen norms, laws, and preven-
tion and enforcement strategies to
tackle corruption. International law
places normative pressure on Pacific
governments even if they do not sign.
Cooperation arising from this treaty,
the oecd Anti-Bribery Convention,
and the UN Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime will
also help to rein in transnational cor-
porations and criminals that actively
encourage corruption.
The incidence of corruption is
linked to the spread and illicit use of
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small arms in developing countries. In
the Pacific and elsewhere, corruption
and small arms proliferation are
prevalent in the exploitation of nat-
ural resources. Poor management of
this sector can provoke armed con-
flicts over valuable commodities,
which in turn attract private and gov-
ernment security personnel. Security
forces give protection to companies
but are often implicated in illegal
exploitation, corruption, and human
rights abuses. Poorly paid and
resourced security forces lack
sufficient will and capacity either 
to prevent small arms leakage from
armories or to retrieve illegal arms.
Corrupt police and military personnel
may even facilitate traffic in small
arms for personal enrichment or
empowerment of associates. As a
result, common criminals, gangs
seeking to influence elections, and
parties to conflicts can gain access to
guns. In weak states, especially those
reliant on resource exploitation, these
trends contribute to a spiraling cycle
of lawlessness, violence, and recourse
to small arms.
At a global level the spread and
illicit use of small arms have had cata-
strophic consequences. “At least
500,000 people die every year as a
result of the use of small arms and
light weapons. Of the estimated 4
million war-related deaths during the
1990s, 90 percent of those killed were
civilians, and 80 percent of these were
women and children, mostly the vic-
tims of the misuse of small arms and
light weapons. In addition, tens of
millions more people have lost their
livelihoods, homes and families
because of the indiscriminate and per-
vasive use of these weapons” (Inogu-
chi 2003, 6). The global total of small
arms stands at 639 million, of which
387 million are in the hands of civil-
ians, the equivalent of one private 
gun for every sixteen persons (Alpers
and Twyford 2003, 12). Conflicts in
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and,
more recently, central Europe, account
for the majority of illicit arms and
their casualties, but no region is unaf-
fected. Some developed countries like
the United States have high rates of
private gun ownership and crime
involving arms.
“The Pacific” was always a mis-
nomer, as in precolonial times bouts
of tribal violence were not uncommon
in the region, and some areas experi-
enced colonization at gunpoint. Dis-
turbingly, in the late twentieth century
the region has succumbed to an esca-
lation in conflict with firearms. The
negative impacts of violence involving
small arms are diverse and extreme.
Direct effects include death, physical
injury, human rights violations, forced
displacement, psychological trauma,
and violence against women. A cul-
ture of violence and lawlessness exac-
erbated by small arms has indirect
and long-term deleterious effects on
social and economic development.
The resulting insecurity disrupts the
funding and provision of essential ser-
vices, deters investment, scares off
tourists, and poses opportunity costs
in the focus and delivery of overseas
development assistance. Small arms
also undermine democracy where they
are used to deny civic rights, intimi-
date voters, extort resources from
government, and usurp political
power via a coup. In the Pacific these
trends have been most evident in
Melanesia, in both dependent terri-
tories and independent states.
Since West Papua was annexed 
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by Indonesia, there has been conflict
between the Indonesian armed forces
(tni) and the secessionist Organiza-
tion for a Free Papua (opm). While
the latter are small in number and
poorly armed, their tenuous existence
has provided a rationalization for
deploying several thousand well-
armed but undisciplined tni forces.
tni elements have been linked to
repression of indigenous civilians,
including extrajudicial killings, par-
ticularly in the vicinity of natural
resource projects. State violence has
continued since Indonesia began its
transformation to a democracy in
1998. There are also fears that armed
militias from other parts of Indonesia
may perpetrate nationalist-inspired
violence against Papuans. Reform of
and reduction in military forces cou-
pled with strengthening of the police
are essential to improve security in
the troubled province. Unfortunately,
the pressing issue of insecurity in
Papua, including the effect of cross-
border gun trafficking on Papua New
Guinea, are not being addressed by
the Forum and disappeared from the
agenda altogether in 2004. 
In New Caledonia, armed violence
flared in the 1980s conflict between
elements of the French community
and indigenous Kanaks. The initial
recourse to arms was by French civil-
ians, but this was soon followed by
the mass deployment of French
troops. Peace was only achieved
through a negotiated political settle-
ment including territorial autonomy
and the prospect of independence.
The Forum has kept a watching brief
on New Caledonia and granted it
observer status. Regional scrutiny and
engagement help to ensure that the
territory does not relapse into armed
conflict. Yet New Caledonia remains
the third most heavily armed entity 
in the Pacific Islands in terms of both
military and civilian firearms. (Papua
is excluded from the eighteen Pacific
Island Countries and Territories
(picts) surveyed [Alpers and Twyford
2004, 283]). New Caledonia should
figure prominently in regional
approaches to curb illicit traffic in
and use of arms, but to date it has
been excluded from such initiatives 
by the Forum.
The coups in Fiji in 1987 and 2000,
and also the coup in Solomon Islands
in 2000, epitomized the dangers posed
by armed security forces in the Pacific.
Elected governments were overthrown
by small numbers of armed men from
the military or police with varying
support or acquiescence from those
agencies. Periodic mutinies in the
Papua New Guinea Defence Forces
and Vanuatu’s paramilitary suggest
that these two states may be at risk 
of similar unconstitutional seizures 
of political power. The role of armed
security forces is questionable in view
of their being implicated in violence
and intimidation against the state and
civilians they are pledged to protect.
In the nine-year armed conflict on
Bougainville, the ill-disciplined PNG
Defence Forces were more often part
of the problem than the solution.
Moreover, in Solomon Islands,
Bougainville, and other parts of Papua
New Guinea, the main source of
weapons for militants and criminals
has been poorly secured military or
police armories.
The war on Bougainville caused
the death of several thousand people,
mainly civilians. Although the Solo-
mon Islands conflict, with several
hundred deaths, was far less lethal,
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armed combatants and outright crimi-
nals caused a prolonged reign of ter-
ror and displaced twenty thousand
people. In the wake of conflicts in
Bougainville and Solomon Islands,
disarmament has been the priority, 
to avoid a resumption of violence 
and diversion of arms to criminals 
or other regional conflicts. Successful
disarmament requires inclusive peace
negotiations, trust in fair procedures
and outcomes, neutral peace brokers
and monitors, and robust law enforce-
ment. A critical factor is political will
on the part of combatants, local
communities, and regional partners,
including a substantial commitment
of resources by the latter. Attempts to
disarm combatants in Pacific conflicts
were not successful until all the above
ingredients were in evidence (Hegarty
2004). Rearmament could still occur
unless strategies are put in place for
peaceful conflict resolution, equitable
development, and effective control
over small arms.
In Bougainville disarmament took
several years, as it could only proceed
in tandem with granting the province
autonomy and a long-term commit-
ment to a referendum on indepen-
dence. In keeping with their side of
the bargain, by October 2003
Bougainville combatants had surren-
dered 1,900 firearms to international
peace monitors. In Solomon Islands
the first international attempt at disar-
mament in 2001 achieved the surren-
der of over 1,000 firearms, but several
hundred high-powered weapons were
still in circulation. In the absence of a
functioning state, it required con-
certed regional intervention in 2003,
involving over 2,000 troops, police,
and civilian personnel, to stop the
leakage of weapons from police
armories and complete the disarma-
ment process. After only five months
the Regional Assistance Mission to
Solomon Islands (ramsi) had col-
lected 3,713 firearms, bringing the
total to 6,000 guns surrendered in 
the space of three years. Despite 
these achievements, in Bougainville
and Solomon Islands many weapons
remain at large and there is a daunt-
ing challenge to reintegrate former
combatants into productive social 
and economic life (Alpers and
Twyford 2004, 296–300).
The current flashpoint for armed
conflict in the Pacific is in the High-
lands Provinces of Papua New Gui-
nea. Philip Alpers has highlighted the
magnitude of the problem. He identi-
fied a major shift in the arms used in
conflicts, from bows and arrows to
high-powered assault weapons. As 
a consequence the death rate has
increased exponentially. In Enga
Province alone, five hundred people
died from firearms in 2003, and this
figure could be an underestimate. The
Southern Highlands is a hot spot, with
more high-powered weapons already
in circulation than there were in the
Bougainville conflict. Most weapons
were made in Australia or the United
States and obtained illegally from
police and military armories. Politi-
cians are heavily implicated in the
small arms trade. Since politicians
began giving guns to their supporters
before and after elections, the death
rate has soared. Reconciliation,
strengthening of police and armories,
and disarmament for development 
are urgently needed in the Highlands.
This should be a priority for Port
Moresby and regional partners if a
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conflagration is to be prevented
(Alpers 2004).
The experience in Melanesia
demonstrates that small arms in Island
communities can cause devastating
violence, lawlessness, and long-term
damage to the society and economy.
Full-blown conflicts aside, firearms
also play a part in crime, including
assassinations. In Sämoa, a cabinet
minister was assassinated with a gun
in 1999; Kanak leaders Jean-Marie
Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene were
shot in 1989; and the same fate befell
Palau’s first President Remelik in 1985.
Civilian gun ownership is highly vari-
able in the Pacific. In tiny Niue 
almost 1 in 5 people owns a regis-
tered firearm, and Sämoa’s rate is
over 1 in 10. Cook Islands’ official
rate is low but estimates suggest the
actual rate could be as high as 1 gun
per 15 persons. Officially New Cale-
donia is third highest, with a rate of
8.48 guns per 100 persons. Most
other Pacific Islands have low rates of
private gun ownership, and in Nauru,
Palau, and the Marshall Islands
firearms are banned. Yet government
armories also pose a concern, in view
of Melanesian precedents involving
theft or misuse. Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga,
Papua New Guinea, New Caledonia,
and French Polynesia have regular
military forces, and police forces are
routinely armed in the latter three
countries, as well as in Solomon
Islands, Federated States of Micro-
nesia, Palau, and Wallis and Futuna
(Alpers and Twyford 2004, 283–284,
300).
Weak Pacific Islands firearms legis-
lation combined with poorly secured
armories have made the region vul-
nerable to illicit traffic in small arms.
Most traffic has been within the
region rather than from external
sources, though this could easily
change. Papua New Guinea advocated
a regional approach to firearms con-
trol in 1996. As a result, the South
Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference
(spcpc) produced the Honiara Initia-
tive in 1998 in which Forum countries
agreed in principle on measures to
combat illicit traffic in firearms. At
the directive of the 1999 Pacific
Islands Forum, the spcpc and Ocea-
nia Customs Organization met in
Nadi to develop a common approach
to weapons control. The key princi-
ples were that firearms possession is a
privilege conditional on public safety
and that stricter controls on firearms
are needed. The practical measures
included prohibited weapons; license
conditions; gun registration, identifi-
cation, and storage; training; border
controls; and penalties (Alpers and
Twyford 2003, 108–111).
The 2000 Forum adopted the Nadi
framework for a regional strategy.
Subsequently, the 2003 Forum
approved a model Weapons Control
Bill. In essence the model emulates
Australian gun laws but can be
adapted to national needs in the
Pacific. The 2003 and 2004 Forums
urged members to adopt the model
law to the fullest extent possible. A
series of regional workshops on small
arms has built on the Nadi frame-
work. Australia, Japan, and the
United Nations hosted one meeting
in Nadi in August 2004 to promote
implementation of the model legisla-
tion in national jurisdictions. They
also examined the need for improved
security management at government
armories.
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In 2001, the first United Nations
Small Arms Conference bolstered
regional efforts to curb arms traffick-
ing, when 150 countries adopted a
detailed Programme of Action. It does
not have the force of international
law but includes politically binding
national, regional, and global mea-
sures, many of which are either opera-
tive in the Pacific or envisaged in the
Nadi framework and model legisla-
tion. Biennial UN meetings are to con-
sider implementation of the program;
the first such meeting was held in
2003. In the space of two years, sig-
nificant progress was made across the
world in public disclosures about and
research on illicit small arms traffic.
The chair of the biennial meeting com-
mended regional cooperation, includ-
ing in the Pacific. She highlighted the
positive role of Pacific nongovernmen-
tal organizations in enhancing govern-
ment understanding of the small arms
problem and emphasized the role of
aid donors in providing training, and
financial and technical assistance
(Inoguchi 2003, 7–13).
Australia and New Zealand have
played a major part in post-conflict
disarmament, promoting tougher gun
controls, and strengthening armories
in the Pacific. Australia has sought
and is currently financing reform of
PNG security forces and regional
police. Aid donors could also set a
positive example in their own firearms
legislation and demonstrate restraint
in their arms exports. Australians and
New Zealanders rank among the most
heavily armed civilians in the indus-
trialized world, with rates of 11 and
22 legal guns per 100 people, respec-
tively. Even this high rate pales along-
side the US rate of 67 guns per 100
Americans; thus, 4 percent of the
world’s population possesses 50 per-
cent of global private firearms. Aus-
tralian legislation tightened up in the
mid-1990s after a series of massacres
shocked the government into action,
but New Zealand and the United
States have permissive gun laws.
Moreover, the United States remains
the largest exporter of small arms and
ammunition to the Pacific Islands,
with official export license approvals
valued over us$1.3 million from 1998
to 2000 alone (Alpers and Twyford
2004, 280–283). All three donors sus-
pended military aid to Indonesian spe-
cial forces after their implication in
atrocities in East Timor, but an immi-
nent resumption is premature in view
of state violence in Papua. The nature
and level of military aid to Fiji, Papua
New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu also
warrants careful consideration.
To date, international approaches
have primarily focused on the collec-
tion and destruction of illicit small
arms. Yet due to a pervasive sense of
insecurity in areas experiencing ten-
sions and conflict, the demand for
illicit arms can remain high. Apart
from legislative approaches and 
other attempts to control—or indeed
eliminate—supply, it is critical that
national governments and aid donors
support community-based efforts to
peacefully resolve conflict and stem
the demand for small arms. Regional
and national strategies are also more
likely to succeed if they actively incor-
porate women’s groups in disarma-
ment, coalition building, and conflict
resolution (casa 2003, 8–9).
Any account of what ails the Pacific
and threatens its prospects for devel-
opment must consider the rapidly
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emerging threat of hiv/aids. The
Australian government paints a grim
picture of the global scope and socio-
economic impact of the disease: “The
hiv/aids pandemic represents one of
the greatest challenges facing develop-
ing countries. An estimated 38 million
people are living with hiv/aids in
developing countries. hiv/aids is
increasing in the Asia Pacific region
with about 7.4 million people cur-
rently affected. . . . hiv/aids threatens
to reverse decades of hard-won devel-
opment gains. It attacks people in
their most productive years, destroys
communities, and disrupts food pro-
duction. Heavy burdens are placed
on already weak health services. The
disease cuts into the fabric of society
and undermines a country’s stability”
(AusAID 2004).
The United Nations established the
unaids program in 1996 to lead
worldwide advocacy and coordinate
action against the disease. UN mem-
bers agreed in the year 2000 on a set
of eight Millennium Development
Goals. The sixth goal is to combat
hiv/aids, malaria, and tuberculosis,
with a specific target of halting and
beginning to reverse the incidence of
these major diseases by 2015. In 2001
a UN General Assembly Special Ses-
sion developed the Declaration of
Commitment on hiv/aids. A United
Nations Global Fund was also estab-
lished to fight aids, tuberculosis, and
malaria. The World Trade Organiza-
tion and the World Health Organiza-
tion have been working to improve
access to and affordability of hiv/aids
anti-retroviral drugs for developing
countries, albeit with disappointing
results in the face of resistance from
multinational drug companies. In the
Asia-Pacific region, governments have
held ministerial meetings and a lead-
ership forum on hiv/aids to facilitate
information sharing and cooperation.
Notwithstanding major interna-
tional campaigns in recent years, the
response to the hiv/aids pandemic
has been slow, often characterized as
“too little, too late” in view of the
magnitude of the threat. After the
virus was first identified in the United
States in 1981, developed countries
were initially preoccupied with their
own prevention and treatment pro-
grams. As a result, the incidence of
hiv/aids is now declining in devel-
oped countries but is increasing expo-
nentially in developing countries. The
global community belatedly and, to
date, ineffectually addressed the plight
of Africa, which had already been
afflicted by hiv/aids for several
decades and accounts for the majority
of victims. Later still Asia became
cause for concern and action. The
Pacific Islands region was among the
last to receive concerted global atten-
tion and resources to combat the
pandemic.
As of December 2003, a total of
8,260 hiv/aids cases were reported
in the Pacific Islands. Papua New
Guinea alone accounted for 7,320
cases, though this country’s tally was
based on 2001 figures and thus out of
date. PNG and the Pacific statistics
may greatly underestimate the inci-
dence of the virus due to inconsistent
reporting and aids not being recorded
as the cause of death. After Papua
New Guinea the highest rates of inci-
dence were reported in New Caledo-
nia, Guam, and French Polynesia in
descending order, though absolute
numbers were also high in Fiji (spc
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2004). A high incidence of hiv/aids
correlates with the presence of mili-
tary forces, perhaps due to their
mobility and recourse to casual or
transactional sex. For similar reasons
relating to the merchant seaman pro-
fession, Kiribati and Tuvalu also have
relatively high rates. The prominence
of hiv/aids in French and US territo-
ries suggests not only that military
bases have contributed to the prob-
lem, but also that association with a
metropolitan power has failed to pro-
duce timely preventive measures.
The situation is dire in Papua New
Guinea. aids is the major cause of
death at the Port Moresby General
Hospital, and reported cases are
increasing by 15 to 30 percent a year.
It is estimated that in 2020, the PNG
working age population will be 13
percent lower than it would have
been without the advent of hiv/aids.
Heterosexual transmission is most
common, with parent-to-child trans-
mission the next most common form.
hiv/aids is prevalent in the capital
but also around primary industry
sites. There are fears that similar
patterns of behavior in Papua New
Guinea will result in the pandemic
there reaching sub-Saharan levels. As
a result of the virus’s scale and cata-
strophic implications for development
in Papua New Guinea, Australia dedi-
cated over a quarter of its interna-
tional hiv/aids budget to the PNG
National hiv/aids Support Project,
amounting to a$60 million from
2000 to 2004 (AusAID 2004).
The hiv/aids pandemic has also
reached crisis proportions in the
neighboring territory of West Papua.
While noting that cases are under-
reported, a US report details the
scope: “There are 1,125 currently
registered cases of hiv/aids in Papua,
80 new cases are reported every
month. . . . It is feared that as many
as 5 percent of Papua’s population is
already infected” (cfr 2003, 77).
Whereas Papua accounts for less than
1 percent of Indonesia’s population, it
has approximately 40 percent of the
nation’s hiv/aids cases. Indigenous
Papuans contract hiv at significantly
higher rates than ethnic Indonesian
residents. This discrepancy is attrib-
uted to the fact that government
health and education campaigns
actively discriminate against or simply
do not reach indigenous Papuans.
“Without a more equitable and com-
prehensive response by the Indonesian
government . . . hiv/aids is likely to
become an epidemic that threatens the
very survival of the Papuan people”
(Yale Law School 2004, 36). The gov-
ernor of Papua, Jaap Solossa, made
the staggering estimate of 15,000
hiv/aids cases. He links this high
incidence to illegal fisheries and log-
ging activities by Thai and Malay
companies in collusion with Indone-
sian military and police. Solossa ranks
these interrelated issues as the most
urgent challenge facing the province
(awpa 2004).
The remaining Pacific Islands have
low rates of infection but there is no
room for complacency. The Islands
exhibit significant risk factors for the
spread of hiv, including a youthful
demographic profile, high rates of
other sexually transmitted infections
and teenage pregnancies, and consid-
erable travel in and out of the region.
In addition, the inequalities and vio-
lence experienced by many women
and the variable access to health
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services do not augur well for the
prevention of hiv/aids (pasa 2004).
Federated States of Micronesia and
the Marshall Islands are at particularly
high risk as teenage pregnancies have
reached 20 percent of total births.
One major obstacle to hiv/aids pre-
vention in the Pacific and elsewhere
is community fear and ignorance,
compounded by prevailing notions
of morality and sin. This has fueled
perceptions that only certain types of
people get hiv and has resulted in
discrimination against hiv sufferers.
Popular misconceptions point to the
need for governments as well as com-
munity and church leaders to cham-
pion the hiv/aids prevention
campaign.
Although the first case of hiv in
the Pacific was identified in 1984, it
was not until 1997 that the Secre-
tariat of the Pacific Community (spc)
launched an initial regional education
and prevention strategy. The Pacific
Islands Forum put hiv/aids on its
agenda in 2002 and expressed grave
concerns about the rate of transmis-
sion and its impact on development.
In 2003 the Forum leaders called for
a new regional strategy to be ready 
by 2004. In January 2004 the French
and Australian governments launched
a major initiative to facilitate national
and regional strategies. The 2004
Forum endorsed a comprehensive
hiv/aids Regional Strategy (2004–
2008) and tasked the Secretariat of
the Pacific Community to develop a
detailed plan of implementation (pif
2004).
The geographic scope of the
regional strategy is broad, as it encom-
passes twenty-one Pacific Island Coun-
tries and Territories. However, it is
flawed due to the arbitrary omission
of West Papua. It makes no sense to
include French and US dependencies
but to exclude the poorest territory,
which may already have the highest
per capita incidence of hiv/aids. In
view of Papua New Guinea’s proxim-
ity to the Papuan capital Jayapura
and southern-based resource projects
(with their associated sex trade and
higher incidence of hiv), the Papuan
pandemic poses serious cross-border
infection problems for neighboring
Papua New Guinea. 
Notwithstanding Papua’s exclu-
sion, the scope of new anti-hiv/aids
campaigns in the Pacific gives grounds
for cautious optimism. They focus on
raising awareness among policymak-
ers and community leaders, develop-
ing behavior change through educa-
tion materials adaptable to local
needs, and improving hiv/aids and
sexually transmitted infections sur-
veillance capacity. The region-wide
effort is complemented by national
strategies supported by an a$5 million
grants scheme launched in August for
government and civil society projects
in Forum Island Countries. The
scheme is coordinated from the Pacific
Regional hiv/aids Project (prhp)
office in Suva. Activities feature train-
ing of hiv workers, hiv/aids testing,
counseling and treatment, home care
and support, and promoting behavior
change with an emphasis on the
“abc” slogan: Abstain, Be faithful,
(or use a) Condom! The main fund-
ing sources for the regional approach
are the unaids program, the UN
Global Fund to Fight aids, Tubercu-
losis, and Malaria (gftam), France,
and Australia (pasa 2004).
In 2004 there was unprecedented
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activity in the region to promote
hiv/aids awareness, education, and
cooperation. It began with a World
Council of Churches Pacific Members’
Consultation (29 March–1 April).
The resulting Nadi Declaration advo-
cated greater activism by the churches.
It included the admission: “We the
churches, are encouraged to seek for-
giveness from God and from (hiv)
Positive People, for not doing what
we ought to have done, and for con-
tributing to their pain and suffering.”
They recognized the need for churches
to create a caring and tolerant envi-
ronment for hiv sufferers and to
improve knowledge, including open
discussion of sexuality. In a bold
stand, the declaration vowed not 
to oppose the use of condoms given
their proven utility as an hiv/aids
prevention method (pasa 2004). The
Nadi Declaration was refreshingly
progressive, but it remains to be seen
whether it will be taken up at the
parish level.
In mid-July the xv International
aids Conference was held in Bangkok
with 15,000 attendees, including
strong representation from across the
Pacific. Thailand provides an inspiring
example of a concerted official strat-
egy to combat hiv/aids. As a result
of a nationwide campaign of aware-
ness raising and condom distribution,
Thailand saw its infection rate drop
from 143,000 in 1993 to only 19,000
in 2003 (pasa 2004). Representatives
of People Living With hiv/aids
(plwha) issued the Bangkok Decla-
ration at their Second Asia Pacific
Congress prior to the official aids
conference. It called for greater
plwha involvement in campaigns
to raise awareness and combat the
stigma of hiv/aids. They also called
for universal access to counseling and
treatment, legal reforms, and social
security support for affected families
(plwha 2004).
Later in July, the Ninth Pacific 
Arts Festival, held in Palau, made
hiv/aids education and prevention a
focus of its activities. Paciﬁc Magazine
also made hiv/aids the theme of its
July issue. The cover headline posed
the grim question: “hiv/aids—Is the
Pacific the next Africa?” spc Director
General Lourdes Pangelinan warned
that the Pacific faced a hiv/aids
threat similar to the one Africa con-
fronted twenty years ago. She fore-
cast that the “tuberculosis (tb) and
hiv co-infection . . . could soon
become the leading cause of death 
in the Pacific . . . The threat to our
societies is real” (PM, July 2004).
A strong commitment to the
anti–hiv/aids campaign is evident
among people living with hiv/aids,
nongovernmental organizations, UN
agencies, aid donors such as France
and Australia, and, increasingly,
Pacific governments themselves.
Unfortunately, not all players in
global politics have lent their support
to effective hiv/aids prevention
strategies. The Bush administration in
the United States, heavily influenced
by the New Christian Right, is averse
to promoting condoms as a means of
family planning or hiv/aids preven-
tion. Many conservative Islamic 
states have taken a similar stance, 
as has the Vatican. Indeed, the Pope
explicitly confirmed the Catholic
prohibition on condoms in January
2005. The United States, Islamic
states, and the Vatican hold the view
that sex education and condom pro-
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motion encourage sex outside mar-
riage. All three advocate “Abstinence”
and “Being faithful” but not “Con-
doms,” thus omitting a key element
of the aids prevention slogan, abc.
This “unholy alliance,” as critics
dubbed it, has obstructed initiatives
to promote safe sex, including at key
UN conferences on women and repro-
duction (Chappell 2004). If these
powerful forces were to give genuine
support to the Millennium Develop-
ment Goal of halting the spread of
hiv/aids by 2015, that goal might
be achievable. 
Corruption, small arms, and
hiv/aids pose a severe threat to
Pacific societies and economies. More-
over, these phenomena are linked.
This is most evident in relation to
natural resource projects where
competition over the spoils provokes
corruption, armed conflict, and other
crimes. Isolated resource workers,
military personnel, and armed com-
batants are more likely to engage in
high-risk sexual behavior, which
spreads hiv/aids. In general, high
levels of corruption and armed con-
flict divert attention and resources
from development, including hiv/aids
prevention. However, these scourges
on society are not amenable to simply
being outlawed. This is partly because
many political leaders and officials set
a poor example. They are often impli-
cated in corruption—and in Mela-
nesia—illicit traffic in small arms,
despite legislation to prevent this.
Moreover, they too may suffer from
popular misconceptions about
hiv/aids. Effectively combating these
negative trends requires awareness
raising and education to strengthen
values, alter norms, and induce volun-
tary changes to behavior. If leaders
are not prepared to instigate such
campaigns, grassroots efforts must
advocate and develop them.
The international community can
assist the region in combating corrup-
tion, small arms, and hiv/aids in
several ways. Already international
codes, laws, and conditional aid are
used to pressure and encourage Pacific
governments to adopt appropriate
norms and measures. Regional inter-
vention and aid projects have increas-
ingly addressed the three issues.
However, aid donors must avoid the
temptation to seek quick cures for
these ills, notably via national legis-
lation, and must instead place more
emphasis on long-term prevention
strategies driven by civil society.
Donors can assist by providing
resources to facilitate regional cooper-
ation (including Papua) and, most
importantly, community activism in
all three domains. This approach is
now evident in the campaign against
hiv/aids but must be sustained over
the long haul. In addition, there is an
urgent need for the region’s external
partners to crack down on transna-
tional resource companies that exac-
erbate the incidence of corruption and
conflict. The nature and scale of legal
small arms exports to the Pacific,
both civil and military, also warrant
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